Disease prevention, however, involved more than merely knowing how to kill a certain virulent bacterium. In any public health problem, non-medical factors such as organization, education, and methods of enforcement also assumed vital roles. In the case of venereal disease, one had to deal as well with a whole set of cultural and psychological factors. For most of the combatants in World War I, those nonmedical problems thwarted the realization of hopes for disease control. The British, in particular, were not able to organize effectively against venereal diseases until the last stages of the war. That they began to do so then was largely attributable to aid and advice from the Americans, who alone among the warring powers succeeded in making effective application of the new medical knowledge. The reasons for the American success, not all praiseworthy, were nonetheless instructive, for they revealed much about the relative strength of public health forces in Britain and America. They also reflected considerable variation in the value systems of the two countries, which explained better than anything the uneven results attained against wartime venereal diseases.
I
When war began in 1914, the British were ill-prepared to cope with venereal disease. Army leaders, who had not fought a major war in over a century, regarded prostitution as something between a necessary evil and a vital auxiliary service. Venereal disease was regrettable, of course, but given the demands of human nature it was not to be avoided. The best that a commanding officer could do was ensure that only healthy women worked his ranks.
Officially, the army frowned on segregated districts, but unofficially they formed part of the organization of every overseas unit. As one officer reported in 1917, "when I first served . . . [in India], we had a bazaar of native women which we kept and where the women were kept clean.... I can assure you that ... I lectured my men on the prevention of disease and how to have connection with a woman without acquiring the disease."2 Owing to tradition, then, when Britain's high command sent soldiers to the continent in 1914, it allowed them to patronize the regulated brothels, or maisons tolkrJes, which the French maintained for their troops.
In France, neither army tried to curb the sexual activity of its men or to prevent lawful prostitution. To do so would have defied the conventional wisdom, which held that an army's morale was dependent on frequent sexual contact and its health, on the medically certified brothel. British units did have treatment rooms where soldiers could get medication (normally calomel ointment) to prevent infection. Furthermore, regulations required a visit to such facilities within twenty-four hours of exposure, but the absence of a penalty for refusing to comply defeated the army's purpose. 3 In 1917, when it began to be apparent that the maison tolrdee was no longer an acceptable solution, either medically or politically, the British Army found itself too steeped in tradition to adjust to new strategies.
On the civilian front, problems were worse. Not until a Royal Commission study appeared in 1916 was it possible to generate viable public discussion of venereal diseases. Physicians and others who had attempted to deal with the problem in the public press or in book form found few editors willing to notice their views.4 Distasteful matters such as syphilis and gonorrhoea simply were not fit topics for civilians. One English doctor, asked to lecture on venereal diseases to a group of soldiers, had just begun his talk when he saw the commander hand a note to the battalion chaplain. The clergyman got up, left the hall, and only returned at the lecture's end. Curious, the doctor asked why he had left. The chaplain replied that his colonel had asked him to go "because he did not consider the lecture a proper one" for clerical ears. 6 Public silence ended with the Commission report. Its findings, especially the claim that ten per cent of the population had syphilis and a much higher proportion, gonorrhoea, received wide publicity in the press and Parliament. 6The Times (London), 6 June 1918, p. 3c.
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American and British responses to venereal disease in World War I of action, the Commission called for public education, curbs on drunkenness and illicit sex, and better facilities for diagnosis and treatment. 6 The recommendations received attention immediately. A private group, the National Council for Combating Venereal Disease (NCCVD), had come into being, in fact, expressly to implement the study. By 1916, the government was placing large funds at its disposal to help meet what one spokesman termed "this terrible peril to our imperial race."7
Yet for all its support, the NCCVD did little to reduce venereal disease. Council critics, mainly physicians, attributed its ineffectiveness to an unwillingness to promote medical prophylaxis, the one approach that might eliminate the disease.8 According to Sir Bryan Donkin, a prominent London doctor, the Council's reluctance was due to a belief that venereal diseases must be fought and overcome on moral rather than medical grounds. Encouragement of preventives would only stimulate Englishmen to sin with impunity, lessening the chance for victory on the moral front. To Donkin, the moral approach had no place in public health. The proper strategy was to use whatever would work, even if that meant distributing ointment and condoms to servicemen before they had sexual contact.9
Although Donkin exaggerated Council opposition to medical approaches, its leaders did tend to be moral crusaders, who frankly preferred to see sickness continue if its elimination meant an increased sexual laxity. As the Archbishop of Canterbury said, "the real foe was not the disease but the vice which was the parent of the disease."10 A mainstay of the NCCVD was Sir Francis Champneys, a leader of the "Old Guard" in London medicine. Champneys, while not unconcerned about public health and military effectiveness, viewed the struggle against venereal diseases chiefly as a form of Christian witness. In a reply to Donkin, Champneys argued that the real issue was not prophylaxis-the NCCVD was for early treatment-but whether prophylaxis would take a form which would lead to sin. That was exactly what Donkin's plan for issuing prophylactic packets would do, for "a man with a packet is more likely to commit himself than a, man who is without one."11
Even if their use drastically reduced venereal disease, the moral cost was too high, for "fornication and adultery in the Christian system," Champneys insisted, "are mortal sins . . . which ... destroy the soul." Far better that "venereal diseases should be imperfectly combated than that, in an attempt to prevent them, men should be enticed into mortal sin . . .".12
By 1917 it was apparent that the NCCVD's approach was not working, at least 
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Edward H. Beardsley not for British and Dominon troops in England and Scotland. While the Council congratulated itself on the expansion of local branches throughout the Empire, prostitution was also growing-at a runaway pace-in major British cities.
The English approach to prostitution differed from the French. The former believed that regulation and inspection of prostitutes were more apt to increase venereal disease than curtail it, because official collaboration with organized vice gave male customers an unwarranted sense of safety. So, local police foreswore all attempts at regulation, intervening only when a woman became so unruly as to create a public nuisance. '3 In the absence of legal controls, professional and amateur prostitutes enjoyed almost full freedom to solicit, and it was mainly Dominion troops they pursued, because Canadians, New Zealanders, and Australians had more money. Apparently, the women were as bold as they were numerous, especially in places like railroad stations and parks. As one medical officer recalled, "in the early days when leave was given to large numbers of men the scenes were disgraceful. One saw 1000s of men coming from Flanders covered with mud, and... although their clothing was muddy they could hardly get through the streets from Victoria Station on account of the women crowding about them and even waiting for them until they had cleaned up and got paid off."'4
Such liaisons need not have resulted in high rates of disease had there been ample treatment centres available to soldiers on leave. Australia's surgeon-general was dismayed by the lack of such facilities, the result of whichwas the infection and incapacitation of some 2000-3000 of his men. The Australians eventually demanded clinics for the bigger British cities. To that request, the surgeon-general "received a reply that the matter had been referred to the Colonial Office and that is, I think, about the reply one expects. In other words ... it will probably be replied to when the war is 
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American and British responses to venereal disease in World War I hundreds. The men cannot get out of or return to the canteen without molestation. I went to the Chief of the Police here and represented the matter to him; he said, 'I know that condition prevails, but I have no authority whatsoever to act' and he does not act."17
All at the War Conference agreed that tighter controls over solicitation was one way to protect soldiers' and sailors' health. The next year London finally moved against the problem, but in the meantime, the situation in the leading cities continued to worsen until by the end of 1917 venereal disease had become a major war problem.18
Although they were barely in the war by that time, Americans, too, regarded venereal disease with serious apprehension. Concern was great because the problem was great, especially in the autumn of 1917, when the first major draft occurred. Health officials and military leaders had anticipated an increase in venereal disease once mobilization began, but no one foresaw what actually occurred. By the end of the second week of mobilization, the disease rate for the new conscript army had vaulted to 357 cases per 1000 men, about four times the Regular Army rate, while in the National Guard it had climbed to 150.19 In the period from September 1917 until the following May, some 80,000 cases were discovered among new soldiers, most of whom brought their infection into the army from civilian lifee.
As if such reports were not alarming enough, scenes around many military encampments that autumn suggested that many more servicemen would soon be infected. South Carolina was one state that quickly took on the appearance of an armed camp and an army of camp followers soon gathered to do their service. The fact that most were diseased led one War Department official to lament that "if the Kaiser could get these women right close to our troops and nobody would keep them away . .. he would win this war."21
If such women saw the war as their opportunity, they failed to reckon with the determination of most other Americans to stop them. In fact, the country had seldom seen the kind of teamwork between public and private sectors and between national, state, and local governments that evolved in 1917 to combat prostitution and venereal disease.
In part, the wartime campaign against vice was a continuation of an earlier crusade dating from the Progressive Era. Not all places were responsive to such pressures. Shreveport, Louisiana, where men of the 39th Division took leave, promised to eliminate its segregated district, but action was hardly vigorous. "At least one notorious house", an Army official reported, "kept running in high gear". The city also did little to stop the flow of liquor to soldiers, and the practice with arrested prostitutes was simply to release them, once they promised to leave town.81
In most places, though, the anti-vice crusade was successful. By the end of the war, the red light district had virtually disappeared from the American urban scene, and as far as service drinking was concerned, it was negligible. One army doctor observed, with only slight exaggeration, that "the U.S. Army at the present time is a body of total abstainers."32 Largely because of the closing of so many brothels and saloons the army's venereal disease rate fell sharply after the autumn of 1917. Merritt Ireland, chief medical officer of the American Expeditionary Force, told of progress with National Army recruits and boasted: "we have taken these young men, and . . . we have cleaned them up until the disease is as low if not lower than the rate in the regular army," whose rate by then had dropped to 55 cases per 1000 men.ss More than just patriotism and teamwork, however, produced those sharply de Clair Drake conceded that his state perhaps went too far in controlling venereal disease. One of the Board's powers was the authority to hospitalize any woman thought to be infected. If she refused, the board posted a large placard on her home reading "suspected VD". While such practice was surely effective, it also opened the way for blackmail of innocent women.35 A Pennsylvania public health officer reflected the get-tough approach of many of his colleagues in the states when he said: "we mean to have our health officials treat the man with gonorrhoea and syphilis ... who cannot be kept under medical control with as little respect to his rights as they would treat one suffering from smallpox."36 Some individuals did not seek any evidence before moving against a suspect. For swift action reminiscent of the Old West, the ladies of Rockfort, Illinois, set the pace. Determined to guard the health and purity of civilians and soldiers in their area, a delegation of women met each train that came to town. If a questionable looking female alighted on to the platform, they took her aside and told her bluntly to "return where she came from". If she refused, the decency brigade thereafter kept her under close watch. "Sooner or later," said an appreciative physician, "she is put in jail or gotten out of town." Such activity, he noted, "has a splendid effect on the cantonment in the prevention of venereal disease."37
Although purity committees, health officers, and government lawyers doubtless helped reduce venereal disease, the most significant deterrent was the army's use of direct medical prophylaxis. In 1912, while the British Army was relying on regulated prostitution, American Army doctors were pressing for a system of early medical treatment. Previously, the army had issued prophylactic kits to its men, but most soldiers had refused to use them. What was needed, doctors successfully argued, was for the army to administer preventive treatment, itself, and require men to take it. To enforce that policy, the War Department ordered that any soldier who failed to get treatment, and later developed venereal disease, would face trial and imprisonment for neglect of duty. If he contracted it despite treatment, he lost all pay during his hospitalization. Early treatment was strongly emphasized, and by the time of the war, army doctors were telling men to wait no longer than three hours after exposure. 
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American and British responses to venereal disease in World War I failing to do so. "It would seem," one doctor argued, "that if we cannot bring the man to the treatment within 60 minutes, the treatment ought to go with him."39 By wartime, however, such practice was no longer acceptable to many military leaders, particularly those who owed their positions to politics. Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels was emphatic about his opposition to the distribution of prophylactic materials. "American mothers," he said, had entrusted their sons to his keeping with the expectation that "every good and Christian influence" would be "fostered and strengthened" by Navy service. "I could not look a boy ... straight in the face .. . if I were approving the policy and use of a measure of this kind."40
Another leader who felt a similar responsibility was General John J. PRO. 197 were even operating houses of pleasure, themselves, in such French ports as CayeuxSur-Mer and Le Havre. Supposedly, commanders urged their men to patronize those places because their girls were sure to be clean." Whether true or not, the stories gained wide circulation in Britain, and in the early months of 1918 were a source of increasing concern to the government. Church leaders began calling for an investigation of army ties to organized prostitution, and by March, the large London dailies were referring to the "Cayeux scandals" and also demanding action."8 Domestic prostitution presented an even graver problem. In 1917 Dominion leaders had insisted that London take steps to protect their soldiers from disease, but the passage of a year saw only a worsening situation. A New Zealand doctor was shocked by the boldness of some English women. In Liverpool, men were not safe even on the second floors of their barracks because prostitutes got at them with the use of scaling ladders.47
Such conditions stirred an angry response from the Dominions, both from agents in London and from people back home. Canada's mothers were especially upset. According to her Privy Council President, they were willing "for their sons to go and die" for the empire, but they would not tolerate their being exposed to sin and disease in British streets. 48 By March 1918, the British government was in serious difficulty, for it stood to lose a large amount of citizen support in Britain and the Dominions over prostitution and venereal disease. Regarding the French brothels, the Secretary of State for War, the Earl of Derby, told his War Cabinet colleagues that a "very large number of the people of the country resent with passionate indignation what they regard as our approval of ... institutions which are alien to the traditions of this country." Unless the government took steps, "the outbursts of indignation will continue to increase and might have a far reaching effect upon the good will of a most respectable part of the community towards the Government and the National cause."'9
In an effort to quiet critics, the War Cabinet took two actions. On 18 March it placed the maisons tolerees out of bounds for Crown troops. Four days later, it issued regulation No. 40d (of the Defence of the Realm Act), making it a criminal offence for any woman with a venereal disease to solicit or have sexual relations with any member of His Majesty's forces. In both steps, the Cabinet saw some risk-that of alienating the French in one case and the House of Commons in the other-but the need for action was too insistent to resist, and hopefully the measures would reduce disease. 50 It was soon apparent that London had been too optimistic. If anything, the March actions only worsened the problem by producing new critics of government policy, while doing little about venereal disease rates. The army felt the government had seriously erred in putting the brothels off limits and frankly communicated that feeling to London. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force complained that the government had surrendered to people whose "main interest in the Army consists in the reduction of fornication on the part of its members." Far from doing that, the March order would only drive French women into the streets to get men and probably with more success than before. Ultimately, he predicted, venereal disease rates would rise and England's combat strength would fall.6' A more serious challenge came from Britain's feminists, who were aflame over the solicitation regulation. More visible and less subject to control than military critics, women's rights leaders also had supporters in Parliament who could make additional trouble for the war government. The women's basic complaint was that the regulation, by subjecting only females to criminal action, was blatantly discriminatory. Moreover, the policy opened the door to persecution and blackmail of innocent women, for the most baseless accusation was enough to precipitate an arrest.52
Women's groups began protesting almost immediately. In April, the Women's Freedom League, a group concerned about equal rights and opportunities, noted its "horror" over Regulation 40d and demanded that the War Office withdraw it immediately. The League also threatened mass protests which would show the opposition, they claimed, of a host of suffragette and trades union societies. The Americans were eager to meet for their own reasons. As U.S. troops found their way to England, medical chief Ireland became as concerned about local conditions as Dominion representatives. What Americans wanted was an extension of Regulation 40d to cover their troops. Ireland also wanted London to take a tougher line against French brothels in the belief that a united front could topple the French system altogether.60
Also important was the opportunity the conference would give the Americans to school the Old World in their approach to morality and health. To the public health profession and to interested laymen of that day, venereal disease had implications that went far beyond military considerations. At stake was the future of the race itself. Blandly confident that they had found solutions to hygienic and moral problems which still troubled most of the world, some Americans were excited by the prospect of helping pull other peoples up to their mark. They had already shown the French how to clean themselves up. Now they could do the same with the British. As Bishop Brent told President Wilson, in seeking his support for the conference, the "moment [is] opportune to secure through you in America and the Prime Minister here a united effort to meet the whole sexual problem . .. with an upward thrust. Your voice can reach the world on this vital matter." '61 The conference, which set as its goal the removal of the "temptations of overseas troops," convened twice that spring and summer, first on 10 May and again on 11 July. 
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Edward H. Beardsley opposition of the Dominions. Also the conference aided the War Cabinet in its determination to retain Regulation 40d, for the government could now argue that 40d was not only helping to control venereal disease but also aiding the American ally.70 II Some years after the war, Pershing remarked that the conference had not been very successful because "little came out of it that was of practical value to us."'7' From that perspective, he was probably right. While the British did extend various domestic regulations to the Americans, London refused to join the effort to eliminate the French brothels, which was what the Americans wanted most. The British, however, saw no justification for mixing in the internal affairs of an allied power, if that country was determined to resist certain changes.
The two views on the question of the maisons tolerees pointed out better than anything the difference between England's and America's approaches to prostitution and venereal disease and at the same time helped to explain why American solutions tended to be more effective. For the Americans, eliminating venereal disease in the Armed Services was important enough to justify almost any means-including coercion and intimidation of fellow citizens, as well as meddling in the internal affairs of friendly nations. The British, on the other hand, hewed closer to normal, peacetime standards of diplomacy and civil liberties when dealing with venereal disease. They interfered with citizens' freedom of movement only reluctantly, and when they did, their courts followed the same stringent rules of evidence used in peacetime.
Although one result of British forebearance was more disease than might have developed otherwise, not all additional venereal disease was attributable to that nation's concern for civil liberties. Certainly the insulation of the British military from the kind of domestic pressures and values that impinged on American Services accounted for part of the problem. With much of Britain's army scattered about the empire before World War I, commanders developed the habit of following local custom in matters of sex. Their American counterparts, however, because they were subject to closer scrutiny from the folks at home, tended to mirror the standards of their countrymen.
That was not to say that Englishmen were unconcerned about the sexual habits of their boys in uniform. In fact, another facet of England's problem was that a certain class of interested citizens wielded altogether too much influence. High-ranking clergymen and upper-class moralists who took the lead in the anti-vice crusade downplayed the medical approach to venereal disease, with the result that such things as clinics and prophylactic treatment never got the attention they did in the U.S. Americans, though equally concerned with sin and purity, kept in mind that the main goal was a healthy army and navy. Accordingly, it was they, more than any of the other allies, who were able to demonstrate the possibilities inherent in medical science for solving one of man's oldest health problems. 
